What is Ablative’s Quad Hop?

QuadHop is mentioned several times on our website but we’ve never explained what QuadHop is. If you are unfamiliar with how .onion services interact with rendezvous points and directories then it would be a good idea to check the Tor Project’s .onion service explainer first. Most operators will run the Tor daemon on the same server as their service daemon (e.g. nginx) and may make mistakes that allow the server to expose the IP addresses on other interfaces, expose fingerprints (e.
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Using InfluxDB, Telegraf, Grafana & Tor .Onion’s To Build a Surveillance Resistant Distributed Metrics Infrastructure

At Ablative Hosting we prefer to use .onion networking everywhere we can. .onion’s ensure that our web properties can never be blocked, our employees can trust the end-to-end nature of the connectivity, our endpoints aren’t exposed in Certificate Transparency Logs. Most importantly; Tor prevents adversaries from tapping the upstream of our metrics or log servers and trivially discovering the IP addresses of all our other servers (or employees) when they connect.
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Support via .onion Only IRC

Did you know that Ablative.Hosting has a .onion only IRCd? Available at irc.hzwjmjimhr7bdmfv2doll4upibt5ojjmpo3pbp5ctwcg37n3hyk7qzid.onion/6667 this IRC server is available for anyone interested in .onion technology whether they are a customer or not. There’s usually one or two members of staff luking in #ablative and we’ll happily help you with any .onion technical queries without a sales pitch! We don’t support services such as NickServ or ChanServ at the moment (mainly as we’re only expecting people to drop in to ask questions / get support for a problem rather than spend any sustained period of time here).
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Proxying Monero

One of the key elements of Ablative Hosting is that it will primarily use cryptocurrencies so it can’t have it’s funding sources pulled as happened to FetLife. Bitcoin transactions are entirely public, ZCash has issues when moving funds between shielded and normal addresses so for the customer who demands the utmost privacy the obvious choice is Monero. When I first set about implementing support for generating Monero addresses (and monitoring transactions to the that address) I had standardised on using nginx to reverse proxy connections to various daemons.
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